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Since January 2017, foreign non-governmental organisations (ONGEs) active in Burundi
are required to respect ethnic quotas (60 per cent Hutu, 40 per cent Tutsi) when
employing local staff. The ethnic quota requirement was adopted amidst fears of re-
ethnicisation of politics and society, enhanced control on civil society and tense relations
between the Burundi government and its aid partners. While authorities justify the
measure as a remedy for decades of discrimination along ethnic lines, an analysis of the
legal reform shows that a variety of other motivations and dominant party interests
account for its adoption and enforcement. While the reform mirrors a wider interna-
tional trend of shrinking civic space, the Burundi case study also shows how a clever
discursive strategy may skillfully divide ONGEs and their funding agencies. Furthermore,
the case study reveals the instrumental use of obscurity and ambiguity in terms of the
legal wording and enforcement of the ethnic quota requirement.
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Introduction
In January 2017, Burundi enacted new legislation governing the admission and func-
tioning of foreign non-governmental organisations (ONGEs) on its territory. An inter-
nationally mediatised row around its implementation peaked when, in September 2018,
the National Security Council suspended all of the approximately 130 ONGEs then
registered in Burundi. At a meeting of the UN Security Council on 13 November 2018,
several members expressed concern (United Nations, 2018a). Some six months after
their suspension, 93 ONGEs were re-admitted. During an interview on TV5 Monde,
multi-award winner Marguerite Barankitse called them collaborators of a fascist
regime.1
One of the most controversial aspects of the legal reform is the requirement for
ONGEs to respect ethnic quotas in the recruitment of local staff. This paper sheds light
on this aspect of Burundi’s new ONGE law, which was shrouded in obscurity and the
subject of major controversy and polarisation. For ONGEs opposed to the reform, it
seeks – at the very least – to extend government control over non-state actors and aid
flows while – at worst – it risks sowing the seeds of renewed ethnic conflict in Burundi.
Government officials, however, framed and justified the measure as a matter of affir-
mative action necessary to counter a longstanding practice of ethnic discrimination in
ONGE local staff employment.
I analyse the ethnic quota provision in the 2017 ONGE legislation using the typology
of effects of law (direct, indirect, independent, and unintended effects) developed by
legal sociologist John Griffiths. The analysis shows how the quota requirement is highly
(and probably deliberately) vague in terms of its direct effects, faces a credibility deficit
in terms of its stated indirect effects, but produces a number of independent effects that
serve various interests of the government and, in particular, the dominant party CNDD-
FDD. The paper analyses the ONGE ethnic quota requirement against the background of
a wider range of contemporary governance challenges in Burundi: ethnic diversity, state-
party relations, and development partnerships. Methodologically, the paper is based on
documentary analysis (legislation, parliamentary documents, official statements, press
releases, tweets, diplomatic cables, etc.) and on interviews and confidential conversa-
tions between January 2017 and June 2019 with forty-four informants (government
officials, diplomats, ONGE staff, etc.), none of whom wish to be identified, for obvious
reasons. ONGEs are named only if they released a public statement (which surprisingly
few of them did).
Before introducing the analytical framework, I first sketch the context in which the
ONGE ethnic quota requirement came about: a history of ethnic conflict followed by
ethnic power-sharing, the return to a tradition of dominant party control over state and
society, and a crisis between the Burundi government and its aid partners.
Context
Burundi’s post-colonial history after 1962 was marked by approximately four decades of
violent political conflict along ethnic lines, followed by a negotiated and initially widely
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applauded (Curtis, 2019; Grauvogel, 2016) institutional re-engineering of the state on the
basis of ethnic power-sharing. Under UPRONA single party rule (1966–1993), Burundi
was characterised by severe horizontal inequalities along ethnic but also regional lines
(Nkurunziza, 2012: 215). Power was largely concentrated in the hands of members of the
Tutsi (demographic minority) group from southern Bururi province. Four months after
the 1993 democratic elections won by the FRODEBU party and its presidential candidate
Melchior Ndadaye (of the Hutu demographic majority group and from central Gitega
province), Tutsi military pre-empted a “hostile” takeover of the state by assassinating the
newly elected president. This unleashed a decade of ethnic civil war between Tutsi
dominated government forces and Hutu dominated armed rebel movements. Following
Tanzanian (Nyerere) and South African (Mandela) mediation, a first peace agreement
was signed in Arusha on 28 August 2000. The Arusha Peace and Reconciliation
Agreement (APRA) included both interim and post-conflict power-sharing institutions,
turning Burundi into the most consociational polity on the African continent (Lemarc-
hand, 2007). An essential feature of the APRA was the use of ethnic quotas to allocate
positions – either on a 50/50 per cent or a 60 per cent Hutu /40 per cent Tutsi basis2 – in
the two chambers of the legislature, in government, the security sector and in state-
owned companies. While the APRA paved the way for elections in 2005 and for a de-
ethnicisation of politics (Reyntjens, 2016), it could not prevent the gradual return to an
increasingly authoritarian regime controlled by a group of (exclusively Hutu) generals
within the dominant CNDD-FDD party, the former Hutu rebel movement led by
incumbent President Pierre Nkurunziza. In 2015, Nkurunziza’s contested third term
candidacy provoked popular protests and a serious split within CNDD-FDD. This cul-
minated in a failed coup attempt and a major humanitarian crisis. A 2018 constitutional
reform formalised the gradual erosion of ethnic power sharing without, however,
completely removing Burundi’s consociational institutions (McCulloch and Vande-
ginste, 2019). In short, the 2017 legal reform faced ONGEs with the “dilemma of
recognition” of ethnic identity in a context where, seventeen years before, recognition
and accommodation of ethnic segmentation were an essential part of the negotiated
solution (King and Samii, 2018).
A second contextual element of relevance here is Burundi’s historical path depen-
dency in terms of state-party relations and political governance. Both old and new
political elites focused on controlling the State and “capturing the associated rents to
sovereignty” (Nkurunziza, 2018: 4) and the new leadership – largely made up of victims
of repression by past Tutsi-dominated regimes – soon “fell back onto the reproduction
and extension of many pre-conflict governance practices” akin to those that made it
initially take up arms (Burihabwa and Curtis, 2019: 566). Both under single party
UPRONA rule and – after a period of institutional collapse during the civil war – under
dominant party CNDD-FDD rule, political and military power entails a guaranteed
access to education, employment, wealth, security, impunity, social prestige, and so on.
After successive electoral victories in 2005, 2010, and 2015, CNDD-FDD has secured
almost complete control over state and society, also by either disbanding or co-opting
and silencing political opposition and local civil society, including media (International
Crisis Group, 2016). The very idea that the ONGE sector, which employed an estimated
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4,000 local staff (EurAc, 2018), remains immune from dominant party interference is
therefore at odds with a long-standing political culture that currently prevails more than
ever since the formal abolishment of one-party rule in 1992. At the very top within the
party, power is in the hands of a nucleus of generals with “maquis legitimacy” operating
outside the formal (officially still bi-ethnic) army commandment structures (Rufyikiri,
2017). The generals’ decision announced by the National Security Council (NSC) –
officially a merely advisory body – to suspend all ONGEs was a rare moment of
transparency about the real locus of power in Burundi. The announcement read out on
television on 27 September 20183 by NSC chair General Silas Ntigurirwa revealed how
matters of vital interest for the regime are decided outside the institutional realm.
Thirdly, the ONGE reform came about in the context of increased tensions between
Burundi and its traditional aid partners. More generally, while reaching out to new
partners less vocal about human rights and democracy, aid-dependent Burundi has
gradually become more and more isolated at the international level. The government
accused both neighbouring Rwanda as well as Western countries, in particular Belgium,
of sponsoring (failed) regime change in Burundi at the time of the 2015 third term crisis
(Re´publique du Burundi, 2016: 12). In March 2016, the EU adopted “appropriate
measures” under Article 96 of the EU-ACP Cotonou Agreement. These aid sanctions
(which is indeed how the government perceives them) were called for by a number
of ONGEs, present in Burundi. Among them were the member organisations of the
European Network for Central Africa (EurAc) (EurAc, 2015). In addition, to attenuate
the impact of the sanctions on the population, several donors announced they would
henceforth provide aid directly to the population through NGOs. In other words, ONGEs
– or those among them with an interest in political governance – were seen as actively
taking part in and benefitting from an international conspiracy against the government,
both by calling for international sanctions and by “diverting” donor money that would
normally be part of bilateral aid. This explains a number of measures – other than the
ethnic quota requirement – that were imposed by the 2017 ONGE law. ONGEs must
deposit one third of their programme budget to a foreign currency account at the Central
Bank; overhead costs should not exceed 35 per cent of the annual budget (Article 16) and
a 35 per cent tax is levied on local staff salaries (Article 39 of the Law of 23 January
2017).
Analytical Framework
In the inaugural lecture he delivered on 19 September 1978, John Griffiths introduced a
typology of the effects of legal rules, distinguishing direct, indirect, independent, and
unintended effects (Griffiths, 1979). Direct effects refer to changes in the behaviour of
the addressees of the legal rule. Primary direct effects concern the behaviour of primary
addressees, often the general public, here ONGEs active in Burundi. Secondary direct
effects refer to the behaviour of secondary addressees, namely state agents responsible
for monitoring, enforcing, and sanctioning the (non-)compliant behaviour of primary
addressees. For instance, the legal rule prohibiting alcohol while driving supposedly has
primary direct effects on the behaviour of anyone driving a car and secondary direct
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effects on the actions undertaken by the police. Indirect effects are the intended social
consequences (e.g. road safety) of the direct effects (e.g. drivers do not drink alcohol).
They are the stated policy goals and societal changes a legislator uses to explain and
justify the adoption of the legal rule. Independent effects are intended but occur inde-
pendently of the rule-conform behaviour. For instance, prohibiting alcohol while driving
may boost the electoral support for the ruling party; adopting anti-corruption legislation
may attract more foreign aid. Finally, legal rules may generate unintended effects, which
the legislator did not seek to attain. Within this category, I introduce the additional
distinction De Zwart (2015) makes between unanticipated versus anticipated unintended
effects. Prohibiting alcohol while driving may have unintended but anticipated negative
effects on the turnover of pubs. As explained below, the 2017 ONGE ethnic quota
requirement produced unintended effects, some of which were probably unanticipated
by the legislator while others were anticipated and traded off against intended (indirect or
independent) effects.
I use this typology as an analytical tool to unravel and structure what is at stake in the
2017 ONGE ethnic quota requirement. Who are the main actors involved in the legal
reform? What were their motivations and perceptions? How was the legal measure
implemented (or not)? What short-term dynamics did it produce? The use of Griffiths’
typology allows for integrating a variety of perspectives on the ethnic quota requirement
and, thus, for capturing the diversity of meanings the reform also had in reality. Focused
on the legal measure, the run-up to it and its immediate aftermath, the use of this ana-
lytical tool obviously does not allow a longitudinal impact evaluation of the reform on,
for instance, horizontal inequalities between ethnic groups in Burundi. This would
require a different methodology and temporal scope. Finally and to avoid confusion,
Griffiths used this typology for an ultimately different purpose than mine. He developed
it as a heuristic technique for his theory and critique on legal instrumentalism, which he
defined as the (naı¨ve) belief that legal rules lead to rule-conform behaviour of the
addressees (direct effects) and, thus, produce the societal consequences desired by
lawmakers (indirect effects). This was an important foundation and stepping stone for his
later well-known work on legal pluralism, namely the presence of multiple (state and
non-state) legal orders that determine people’s behaviour in one social field (Griffiths,
1986). In this paper, I use Griffiths’ typology of effects of law without, however,
adopting a legal pluralist perspective.
Direct Effects: The Law’s Instrumental Obscurity in Terms of
the Expected Behaviour of its Addressees
In line with the analytical framework, I distinguish between primary and secondary
direct effects. A striking feature of the 2017 ONGE quota requirement is the extremely
vague character of the legal provision both in terms of expected behaviour of the primary
addressees and of the officials in charge of rule enforcement. Two important conse-
quences are worth mentioning upfront. On the one hand, the obscurity created room for
arbitrary enforcement. On the other hand, it suggests that an important (if not the main)
motivation of the lawmaker were the independent effects – which, as noted above, arise
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independently of the rule-conform behaviour of the addressees – rather than the indirect
effects, which do depend on the rule-conform behaviour and therefore require clarity on
the expected behaviour of the primary and secondary addressees.
In terms of its primary direct effects, the 2017 ONGE law stipulates that “Hiring of
local staff must be done in accordance with the ethnic and gender balances provided in
the Constitution of the Republic of Burundi.”4 On at least three accounts, this provision
lacks clarity. First, the Constitution does not include any ethnic and gender balance for
ONGEs or, more broadly, for private sector employment. The provision is therefore
strictly speaking void and meaningless. Secondly, the provision refers to hiring of staff,
suggesting it affects only new vacant positions, not existing staff. This reading is a
contrario confirmed by the only other provision that refers to local staff and imposes a
tax on the salary of all Burundian employees hired and employed by ONGEs (Article
38). Thirdly, the law does not explain how ONGEs are supposed to implement the
provision. How to register ethnic identity without undue interference with privacy rights
of staff?5 If the existing situation is not in accordance with the required ethnic balance,
should ONGEs dismiss staff? In response to these and other questions raised by ONGEs,
journalists and diplomats, the meaning and scope of the measure was gradually clarified
through a combination of public and informal statements by government and party
officials. This in itself was, not surprisingly, perceived by many ONGEs as a con-
firmation of the arbitrary and intimidating nature of the decision. The measure was said
to be of immediate application to all existing staff. Ethnic quotas to be applied were those
used for political positions and state-owned companies (60 per cent Hutu, 40 per cent
Tutsi), in combination with a 30 per cent quota for women. Furthermore, ONGEs who
argued they did not know the ethnic identity of their staff were told: “If you pretend you
don’t know, we will tell you because we know.” In terms of secondary direct effects, the
law announces the establishment, by presidential decree, of an Inter-Ministerial Follow-
Up Committee. This Committee shall report to the existing National Aid Coordination
Committee (CNCA), which advises the Foreign Minister who decides on continuation or
suspension of the ONGE (Article 37). Within six months, ONGEs must comply with the
new rules (Article 38).
The reaction of ONGEs varied. While at least one ONGE conducted a census asking
staff to fill out a form mentioning ethnic self-identification,6 many other ONGEs – at
least initially – refused to comply. None of the ONGEs, however, challenged the pro-
vision in court. According to an ONGE official, it was impossible to find a lawyer who
dared taking the matter to court. Instead, Rassemblement, Echanges et Solutions entre
ONG (RESO) – the network of most (but not all) ONGEs in Burundi which acts as an
interlocutor with the authorities since 1999 – proposed a dialogue with the government to
develop a charter, acceptable to all parties, outlining the implementation and enforce-
ment modalities (i.e. the secondary direct effects) of the new law. Interestingly, Foreign
Affairs Minister Nyamitwe went along with the idea of a negotiated charter, thus taking
some distance vis-a`-vis the more hardliner positions on government side. By December
2017, however, the dialogue came to an end without an agreed charter. For RESO, the
main stumbling blocks were the proposed establishment of two types of recruitment
committees – one internal committee within every ONGE and one governmental
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recruitment committee established in each of the 18 provinces, appointed by the Minister
of the Interior and in charge of approving every new local staff recruitment – and the
severe sanctions in case of false statements about ethnic identity. In April 2018, the
Foreign Minister was replaced and his successor never reactivated the dialogue with
RESO on an implementation charter. Around the time of the constitutional referendum in
May 2018, the ONGE crisis seemingly calmed down. However, because no presidential
decree had been adopted on the implementation of the 2017 law, ONGEs were left in
legal limbo, acutely aware that they could be called to order at any time.
In September 2018, the crisis flared up. On 12 September 2018, the Senate announced
it would visit all ONGEs to verify the composition of their local staff. Absent any legal
basis in the 2017 ONGE law and making use of the obscurity in terms of its secondary
direct effects, the Senate referred to its constitutional powers to verify the ethnic and
gender balance in the public administration, stressing that ONGEs are subject to the
same constitutional rules. This was, at the very least, a highly creative reading of both the
Constitution and the 2017 ONGE law. Next, as mentioned above, on 27 September 2018,
the National Security Council on television announced that, as of 1 October, all ONGEs
were suspended for a three-month period because of their failure to respect the 2017
ONGE law. At a meeting on 2 October, Interior Minister Barandagiye – again without a
ministerial ordinance or any other written text – clarified the decision, which, he argued,
was taken by “a supreme organ situated above all ministries and chaired by the Head of
State,” an empirically correct but legally nonsensical statement.7 To be readmitted,
ONGEs must produce four documents: (1) a cooperation agreement with the foreign
ministry, (2) a technical protocol with the line ministry, (3) a commitment vis-a`-vis the
finance ministry to respect Burundi’s banking legislation, and (4) a plan to correct ethnic
and gender imbalances within three years. The fourth document was the most contro-
versial and, although this provided somewhat more clarity on the primary direct effects
of the ONGE ethnic quota requirement, obscurity continued to prevail. While a template
and a circular by Finance Minister Ndihokubwayo further clarified the third required
document, no further instructions were given with regard to the fourth. At least three
interpretations prevailed among ONGEs and their donors. According to the strictest
reading, the fourth document should list all names of local staff with their gender and
ethnic identity. For most ONGEs and European states funding them this was unac-
ceptable. According to a second reading, the document should merely mention ethnic
and gender statistics, without listing individual staff. For at least one European donor
(but not so for several others nor for the United States), submitting ethnic statistics also
crossed a red line with potential negative implications on future ONGE funding. Using a
third interpretation, several ONGEs refused to provide details on the ethnic composition
of existing or future staff and merely committed to developing a new recruitment pro-
cedure without explicit8 references to ethnicity. RESO developed two versions of a
standard template – one on the basis of the second, the other on the basis of the third
reading – that however failed to obtain consensus among its members.
Did the ethnic quota requirement effectively produce the desired primary effects,
inducing compliant behaviour by ONGEs? I have not been able to determine how many
ONGEs submitted either lists detailing ethnic identity of their local staff or “anonymous”
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lists with ethnic statistics. In fact, none of the ONGEs that were readmitted – 84 before
the 1 January 2019 deadline, 93 by the end of March 2019 – published the four docu-
ments or clarified what kind of “fourth document” they submitted to the Burundi
authorities. Some ONGEs obtained their readmission allegedly without submitting an
“ethnic fourth document.” For some, this was due to the fact that they did not have any
local staff. Others benefitted from a remarkable and exceptional week of flexibility early
November 2018 when several ONGEs were readmitted – according to some to their own
surprise – without providing ethnic data on their local staff. Still others, like Doctors
Without Borders (MSF), were allowed to continue operations, allegedly without sub-
mitting an “ethnic fourth document,” for reasons related to the law’s unintended effects
explained below. Finally, unsubstantiated rumour had it that some ONGEs informally
submitted “ethnic” annexes to their “non-ethnic” fourth document and even that some
ONGEs added a financial incentive to support their file. The decisions taken by the
Interior Minister to either accept or refuse re-admission were poorly motivated and do
not allow to determine the criteria that were used to assess the applications. They
consisted of no more than a short, two-paragraph letter to the ONGE, either noting that
“all requested documents have been submitted” (in case of re-admission) or that “the
documents submitted do not meet our expectations, because they neither reflect the
current situation nor the steps that will be taken to correct possible imbalances in light of
the constitutional quotas” (in case of refusal).9 When closing their office in Burundi,
some ONGEs – including Handicap International, Attorneys without Borders, 11.11.11,
and Re´seau des Citoyens – released a public statement stating their inability, for
deontological reasons, to abide by the ethnic quota requirement.
In May 2019, more than two years after the adoption of the 2017 ONGE law, the
cabinet of ministers discussed three presidential decrees specifying its secondary direct
effects, namely on the establishment of an Inter-Ministerial Follow-Up Committee and a
Single Window – as required by the ONGE law – and on the establishment of
Recruitment Committees – as suggested in the Charter unsuccessfully negotiated
between RESO and the Foreign Minister (see above). In June 2019, before the decrees
were even signed, the Finance Minister requested all ONGEs to fill out a template for
each of their projects, including the ethnic composition of their local staff.10 Once again,
the legal basis for this request was unclear. In short, as of June 2019, three different
ministries (Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Finance) and the Senate were monitoring
compliance with the ethnic quota requirement.
Few interlocutors I interviewed attributed the vagueness of the ONGE ethnic quota
legislation to the government’s ill preparedness and the lack of time or technical
expertise to draft and explain the measure. Most interlocutors pointed at the deliberate
and instrumental nature of the obscurity in terms of both primary and secondary direct
effects of the ONGE ethnic quota requirement. By omitting to provide more written
guidance to ONGEs on how to comply with the law and by having a plethora of self-
declared monitoring bodies,11 the government created room for arbitrariness to either
readmit or expel ONGEs and effectively stirred uncertainty, division, and self-imposed
restraint among ONGEs, thus producing one of the independent effects mentioned
below.
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Indirect Effects: The Contested Justification of the Ethnic Quota
Requirement as Affirmation Action
What societal goal did the government seek to attain? During the parliamentary debate
and in the draft Charter, it was explained that affirmative action was the policy aim that
motivated the quota requirement: redressing a legacy of discrimination along ethnic lines
and, thus, promoting social cohesion and reconciliation. In a joint statement, the United
States, Canada, Switzerland, Japan, the EU and its member states and UN agencies
recognised “Burundi’s aspirations to reach a labour force that reflects the country’s
social diversity.”12 US ambassador Casper, considered quite supportive of the reform by
her European peers, tweeted: “From the debate in Burundi over NGO hiring, I have come
to see that what is at stake with #reconciliation is not just about healing memories but
also about who accesses opportunities and how.”13 Two obvious questions arise. Was
unequal access to ONGE employment indeed a problem? If so, why did no ONGE
publicly endorse the “affirmative action”-frame (as diplomats did in their statement) and
why did many ONGEs reject the quota-based solution?
Burundi’s civil war was grievance-based and distributional. The first rebel move-
ment, established some years after the 1972 “selective genocide” (Lemarchand and
Martin, 1973) against Hutu, was not coincidentally named after “the need to liberate the
Hutu” (PALIPEHUTU – Parti pour la libe´ration du peuple hutu). Horizontal inequalities
affected all societal domains (security sector, political institutions, judiciary, higher
education, public sector employment, etc.) and, as noted above, were both regional and
ethnic. Regarding employment, Nkurunziza (2018: 219) notes that, as of 2000, 89 per
cent of all state-owned company managers were Tutsi (11 per cent Hutu) and 61 per cent
were from southern Bururi province (39 per cent from the rest of the country). Although
hard and updated quantitative data are lacking, extensive field research conducted in
2006 on thirty-three ONGEs (all of them RESO members) shows that local ONGE staff
was overwhelmingly Tutsi (Munezero, 2008), not because of a deliberate policy of
ethnic discrimination by ONGEs but because of a longstanding practice of clientelism –
hiring of new staff from networks of existing staff – and because of the availability of
generally better trained Tutsi applicants with the required medical, legal, or other
expertise, in turn a result of decades of ethnic discrimination in higher education
(Lemarchand, 1994: 138). Of critical and existential importance was – and remains14 –
the ethnic cleansing at the public Universite´ du Burundi (UB) in 1995. Several among the
current Hutu leadership – many of them also “orphans of 1972” as they are sometimes
called – were students who narrowly escaped the 1995 UB massacres, including CNDD-
FDD secretary-general Ndayishimiye, Interior Minister Barandagiye, Attorney General
Bagorikunda and former Foreign Affairs Minister Nyamitwe, who published his own
account of the events (Nyamitwe, 2006). Research conducted eight years after the first
post-conflict elections won by CNDD-FDD, the former Hutu rebel movement, shows
that 82 per cent of UB teaching staff – essentially made up of former UB students and
assistants – were Tutsi (Nsaguye, 2013: 57).
While – admittedly few, probably due to the controversy surrounding the 2017 law –
intellectuals like Batungwanayo (2018) and Cishahayo (Minani, 2019: 158) recalled the
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historical context and underscored the need to address the discrimination, many
ONGEs – mainly European, less so American – did not “buy” the affirmative action
frame of the 2017 quota requirement as its real motivation. Two main reasons stand out:
the absence of a real policy and the risk of abuse.
First, the ethnic quota requirement was laid down in just one sentence in the 2017
ONGE law. It was an isolated measure, imposed twelve years after the CNDD-FDD
came to power and not integrated in a broader policy on affirmative action and the use of
ethnic quotas. Not involved in the APRA negotiations, CNDD-FDD always expressed
reluctance against the use of quotas. In an interview in October 2004, ten months before
taking the oath as President of Burundi, CNDD-FDD leader Pierre Nkurunziza stated
that “CNDD-FDD is hostile to quotas,” arguing that conflict, politics and society in
Burundi should not be reduced to ethnic divides and hoping the APRA-based quotas
would soon be removed with the help of civil society.15 Since the first post-conflict
elections in 2005, no public debate was ever held on affirmative action in private sector
employment, unlike in other countries like Malaysia (where quotas were used) or South
Africa (where targets, rather than quotas, were used) that developed policies to redress a
legacy of identity-based discrimination in employment and education (Lee, 2016). The
2014 National Policy Document on Employment – seventy pages long – identifies age-
based, gender-based, and disability-based discrimination but remains completely silent
on ethnicity-based discrimination (Re´publique du Burundi, 2014). The 1993 Labour
Code – which has not been revised – prohibits distinction, exclusion or preference based
on ethnic origin in the area of employment, promotion or remuneration (Article 6). The
2011 Law on Higher Education merely contains a general non-discrimination clause
(Article 7), without any reference to measures aimed at compensating historical dis-
crimination in terms of access to tertiary education. In other words, the ONGE ethnic
quota requirement was not at all embedded in a policy based on prior dialogue, expert
consultations, parliamentary hearings, and a consensus across political and ethnic lines.
To defend the quotas, officials occasionally referred to the “spirit of Arusha” – which
was convenient in terms of public discourse and for strategic political reasons, as
explained below – and to the indeed rather systematic use of the 60/40 per cent quotas for
the composition of senior bodies that, constitutionally speaking, are not subject to the
ethnic quota requirement, such as the Electoral Commission, the Truth and Reconci-
liation Commission, and the National Observatory for the Prevention and Eradication of
Genocide. It is important to note, however, that the ethnic quotas laid down in the APRA
were, above all, a typically consociational mechanism seeking minority protection (in
the Burundian case: benefitting the Tutsi demographic minority) rather than an affir-
mative action mechanism benefitting the historically disadvantaged group (in the Bur-
undian case: the Hutu demographic majority) (McCulloch and Vandeginste, 2019:
1181). Given this background, what does the APRA tell on employment and the use of
ethnic quotas? On public sector employment, the APRA explicitly states that recruitment
must be based on objective criteria of aptitude and on “the need to correct imbalances
and achieve broad representation” (Protocol II, Chapter 1, Article 10). This dual prin-
ciple was incorporated in the 2005 Constitution, without the use of quotas for civil
servants (Article 143) but – in line with the APRA – with powers for the Senate to
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monitor the implementation of the constitutional aim to achieve a more balanced ethnic
and gender representation in all state institutions, including the public administration
(Article 187). On private sector employment, the APRA contains no specific provision
but implicitly discourages quotas. Its general principles and measures on the fight against
exclusion seem to apply here, namely the “deliberate promotion of disadvantaged
groups, particularly the Twa, to correct existing imbalances in all sectors. This exercise
shall be conducted, while maintaining professionalism and avoiding the quota system
[ . . . ]” (Protocol I, Chapter 2, Article 7 – emphasis added).
Secondly, the ONGE law of January 2017 was adopted amidst internationally med-
iatised fears of escalation and re-ethnicisation of conflict in Burundi (Purdekova, 2019).
In May 2016, International Crisis Group noted that “the Tutsi community stills feels
persecuted and there is a widespread fear that the government plans a genocide”
(International Crisis Group, 2016: 13). In September 2016, the UN Independent Inves-
tigation on Burundi noted “the general trend of ethnically divisive rhetoric by the
Government, which may carry a serious potential of the situation spiralling out of
control” (United Nations, 2016: 13). In November 2016, FIDH and Iteka published a
200-page report entitled “Repression and genocidal dynamics in Burundi,” as a result of
which Iteka – Burundi’s oldest human rights league established in 1991 – was banned.
Also in November 2016, the Senate launched an ethnic census of all civil servants, which
again gave rise to the use of the term genocide in international media coverage.16 Given
this context and its use in the communication strategy by opposition actors (Vircoulon,
2018: 12), several ONGEs did not want to take the risk of collecting data that, so they
feared, might at some point be used to target Tutsi among their local staff. One ONGE
director I met referred to “Aiding Violence,” Peter Uvin’s account of the shortcomings of
development actors in the run-up to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda (Uvin, 1998). It is
worth noting that this ONGE risk aversion was clearly inspired by the climate of fear
prevailing after the 2015 failed coup attempt. Five years before the adoption of the 2017
ONGE law, during Round 5 (2011–2013) of its national survey on democracy, gov-
ernance and society, Afrobarometer (and its local NGO partner) asked 1,200 Burundian
respondents for their ethnic identity. At that time, this did not cause any controversy.17
In summary, while the legacy of pre-war ethnic discrimination surely warranted
affirmative action and while some officials like former Foreign Affairs Minister Nya-
mitwe had personal reasons to award priority to it, the context made many ONGEs
seriously doubt as to whether this stated indirect effect was indeed the government’s
(read: the generals’) sole or main or even marginally relevant motivation.
Independent Effects: Dominant Party Interests Motivating the
Ethnic Quota Requirement
Laws may produce effects that do not depend on the conforming behaviour of the pri-
mary addressees. Nevertheless, they may have important explanatory value for why the
legislator enacted the law. I introduce three independent effects of the ONGE ethnic
quota requirement: boosting electoral support for CNDD-FDD; weakening civil society;
and protecting national security and sovereignty.
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First, the ONGE ethnic quota requirement serves the agenda of CNDD-FDD ahead of
the 2020 general elections. It enables the party to boost its image as the defender of the
Hutu electorate’s interests. In February 2019, CNDD-FDD secretary-general Ndayish-
imiye declared that there is no longer any discrimination between Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa
and that everybody is now entitled to an equal share in the public goods, an implicit but
clear reference to the party’s achievement to end pre-war Hutu discrimination.18 Fur-
thermore, the adoption of the law sent the clear message that CNDD-FDD holds the key
to accede to the financially interesting and socially prestigious jobs (Munezero, 2008:
16) within ONGEs, just like it does for jobs in the civil service. The proposed invol-
vement of provincial committees, appointed by the minister of internal affairs, in the
hiring of new ONGE staff reinforced this effect. Furthermore, to defend the ONGE quota
requirement, some party officials and government supporters cleverly referred to the
“Arusha spirit,” as noted above. This allowed them to reveal the inconsistency and
undermine the credibility of the political opposition and civil society who, since 2015,
constantly wave the APRA as the gold standard of peace in Burundi [ . . . ] but who refuse
to apply its spirit to the employment of local ONGE staff (Ruvyogo, 2019).
Secondly, for many international non-governmental (see e.g. EurAc, 2018) and
intergovernmental (see e.g. European Parliament, 2017) organisations, the adoption of
the 2017 law served the purpose of establishing tighter control on ONGEs and shrinking
space for civil society more generally. The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law
expressed concern at the “intrusive regulation” and “severe limitation on the
independence” of ONGEs (ICNL, 2017). While part of a wider continental and global
trend (Buyse, 2018; Civicus, 2018: 12), Burundi’s new legal ONGE framework “stands
out for its unabashedly invasive framework” according to Freedom House (Musila,
2019: 11). Government officials themselves also occasionally referred to the need to
reduce ONGE “disorder” and “chase ONGEs whose activities are contrary to Burundian
culture,”19 and to stop ONGEs from “replacing the State.”20 The adoption of the ONGE
law was thus in line with earlier measures vis-a`-vis domestic civil society, in particular
the banning or suspension of ten local – mostly human rights – NGOs in October and
November 2016. The most extreme form of control was obviously the non-readmission
(de facto expulsion) of some ONGEs. Less extreme, but equally effective was the pre-
emptive self-restraint adopted by the remaining ONGEs, in particular those with an
interest in political governance. Faced with the repeated announcements that officials
will monitor them and visit their premises, some ONGEs understandably feared being
blamed for “undesirable” activities or being caught with “subversive” documents.
Before leaving Burundi, at least one ONGE destroyed its own archives. In addition, the
ethnic quota requirement strongly divided ONGEs thus reducing their collective bar-
gaining power. Furthermore, the law pulled all ONGEs – including those without an
explicit interest in political governance – into a political debate and heavily affected their
legitimacy. ONGEs who were readmitted – none of them communicating transparently
on their application – were suspected of collaborating with the regime and prioritising
business turnover over staff security. On 4 January 2019, the popular anonymous
account @iBurundi tweeted “We are looking for the names of the 84 foreign NGOs who
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accepted to ignore Humanitarian Principles in order to accommodate @BurundiGov.
There will come a time when the NGOs might regret their decisions.”21
Thirdly, at least for some officials, the ONGE law was also inspired by security
considerations. It allowed the government, if necessary, to remove those ONGEs
reluctant to abide by the ethnic quota requirement, also the prime suspects of employing
mainly Tutsi and of acting as Trojan horses delivering information to international
watchdogs (most notably the International Criminal Court, which opened a preliminary
examination in April 2016, and UN investigators). The very fact that the National
Security Council – not a body in charge of affirmative action – suspended ONGEs stands
witness to this motivation. Furthermore, the suspension was decided immediately after
the UN Commission of Inquiry, established by the UN Human Rights Council after the
2015 crisis, published a well-documented report concluding that serious human rights
violations, including crimes against humanity, persisted in 2017 and 2018 (United
Nations, 2018b). According to the then Burundian ambassador in France, ONGEs are not
in Burundi to promote development but to protect the interests of their funding agen-
cies.22 Since the 2015 crisis, some ONGEs and their Burundian partner civil society
organisations – in particular those perceived to be controlled by an urban Tutsi lead-
ership suspected of loyalty to the old UPRONA regime (Bertelsmann, 2018: 29) – have
been accused of taking part in a Western conspiracy stirring regime change in Burundi
(Kavakure, 2016: 148). According to two government officials I interviewed, at the
height of the popular demonstrations against President Nkurunziza’s third term in April
to May 2015, at least two ONGE vehicles transported weapons. Security considerations
did not only inspire government action vis-a`-vis ONGEs. They may also explain why the
local office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights was closed (Rufyikiri,
2019: 6). On 3 June 2019, the Interior Minister suspended governance watchdog
PARCEM, arguing that the latter’s activities “tarnish the image of the country and its
leaders, in order to disturb peace and public order.”23
Unintended Effects: A Reform Spiralling Out of Control?
Finally, laws often generate unintended effects. While not the purpose of the law-making
activity, they are part of the new social reality shaped by the legislation. As De Zwart
(2015: 292) rightly notes, a lack of intention is not necessarily identical to a lack of
anticipation. Indeed, while some effects may catch the legislator by surprise, other
unintended effects may be unwelcome but foreseen side effects. They are traded off
against intended (indirect or independent) effects. Applied to the ONGE ethnic quota
requirement, while it is not always clear which of the unintended effects were anticipated
and which were not, some were clearly not due to errors or ignorance but rather to a
rational cost-benefit analysis.
In October 2018, the UN Secretary-General attributed the suspension of a voluntary
repatriation programme of Burundian refugees and the downscaling of humanitarian
support to 70,000 Congolese refugees in four camps in Burundi to the suspension of
ONGEs (United Nations, 2018c: 7). This illustrates a first unintended effect, namely the
short-term impact of the ONGE suspension on the humanitarian situation. Furthermore,
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a number of longer-term humanitarian and developmental risks were associated with the
possible departure of some ONGEs the Burundi government badly needed. Some of
these ONGEs were also involved in the implementation of development programmes of
intergovernmental actors. One critically important partner – even more so after the Ebola
outbreak across the border in neighbouring DRC and the cholera outbreak in Rumonge
town in December 2018 – was Doctors without Borders (MSF). Interestingly, allegedly
without introducing an “ethnic” version of the fourth document required by the Interior
Minister,24 MSF continued its activities pending its request for readmission (which it had
not received by the 31 December 2018 deadline25) and after receiving its readmission in
March 2019.
Although it is hard to tell how many actually used them, a number of ONGEs con-
sidered the use of evasion mechanisms, a second unintended effect. These included:
replacing local staff by local consultants; registering as a foundation rather than as an
ONGE; and relocating the ONGE office to a neighbouring country and implementing
programmes through partnerships with local NGOs – not (or not yet?) subjected to the
same ethnic quota requirement – rather than by Burundian staff. One other evasion
strategy, namely the hiring of international staff to replace local staff, was blocked from
the very start. Another provision of the 2017 ONGE law allows the hiring of interna-
tional staff only when the required expertise is not locally available.
A third unintended effect was the negative impact on the government’s relationship
with its bilateral aid partners. As noted above, donors funding ONGEs were forced to
draw some red lines, which they did not want ONGEs to cross. So the ONGE crisis
indirectly also amounted to some arm-wrestling between the government and its bilateral
aid partners. More importantly and probably unanticipated by the government, the
ONGE ethnic quota requirement weakened the position of those diplomats and civil
servants who internally – that is, within their ministry or department – called for a
gradual end to the “appropriate measures”-regime (aid sanctions) adopted under Article
96 of the EU-ACP Cotonou agreement in March 2016.
Finally, an outstanding question is what effect the measure may generate on social
relations in Burundi. As noted in the introduction, the APRA adopted ethnic quotas to
share positions in the senior political and security sphere. This institutional engineering
significantly contributed to a de-politicisation of ethnicity, a de-ethnicisation of political
mobilisation (Van Acker et al., 2018) and a de-ethnicisation of electoral violence
(Colombo et al., 2019: 335). The non-consensual extension of the use of ethnic quotas to
the ONGE sector, however, puts ethnicity back at the heart of political contestation and,
at societal level, of competition for employment. Since the 2015 crisis, there has been a
creeping re-ethnicisation of public discourse in various spheres of society (see i.a.
Paviotti, 2019; Van Acker et al., 2018: 87) and ethnicity continues to have major
mobilising power at societal level given Burundi’s history of violent conflict along
ethnic lines (Gatugu, 2018: 60). During the National Assembly debate in December 2016
on the ONGE bill, some members of parliament expressed a concern about the risk of
ethnicisation of society, to which the Interior Minister replied that ethnic balancing has
shown to be a salvation for the evil of ethnic exclusion.26 However, one ONGE with
some 60 local staff experienced internal tensions along ethnic lines when complying
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with the 2017 ONGE law. While it is too early to draw firm conclusions, it is clear that if
the ONGE ethnic quota requirement contributes to a re-ethnicisation of society, this
will – at best – have been an anticipated unintended effect.
Conclusion
Understanding the multiple meanings of the ethnic quota requirement imposed on
ONGEs active in Burundi is complex. Despite the undeniable legacy of ethnic dis-
crimination and historical injustice against the demographic Hutu majority, it can clearly
not be reduced to one single “affirmative action”-motivation on behalf of the lawmaker.
For a variety of reasons, including the tense political climate around the time of its
adoption and early implementation, it has been perceived differently and with great
suspicion by ONGEs, the very large majority of which have abstained from commu-
nicating publicly about their response to the requirement, thus contributing to the con-
troversy around the measure.
A striking observation is the obscurity of the wording of the law, in particular of the
desired behaviour of its primary and secondary addressees. There are various reasons to
believe that this obscurity was not accidental but instrumental. First, two and a half years
after its initial adoption, the exact legal requirement and the consequences in case of non-
compliance have not been clarified in writing. Several ministries, the Senate and the
National Security Council have seized the absence of a clear legal framework to grant
themselves monitoring and enforcement powers, thus confronting the remaining ONGEs
without a continuous threat of arbitrary and intrusive controls. Secondly, the obscurity
enabled government actors to conceal internally divergent perspectives while, at the
same time, combining and reconciling their different agendas (as reflected in the inde-
pendent effects). Furthermore, learning from previous experiences, most notably the
2015 third term crisis (Vandeginste, 2016), the Burundi authorities may well have
professionalised themselves in organising and exploiting legal loopholes in politically
sensitive matters.
The analysis also shows that context matters enormously to understand the use of
ethnic quotas. During the APRA peace talks, ethnic quotas were agreed upon for Bur-
undi’s political and security institutions as part of a minority protection mechanism.
However, the same quotas, extended to ONGE employment, are currently perceived by
ONGEs with an interest and expertise in political governance as a potential threat for
members of that same demographic Tutsi minority. Without wanting to analyse the
counterfactual scenario, it is likely that the inclusion of such quotas in the APRA or their
adoption as a result of a wider parliamentary debate on affirmative action after the first
post-conflict elections would have led to very different reactions on behalf of ONGEs
and donors. In the current context, however, both the timing of the legal reform and the
absence of a broader policy on affirmative action suggest that the government’s refer-
ence to a legacy of discrimination amounted above all to the skilful use of a discursive
frame which it drew from an internationally mediated peace agreement and which served
the purpose of justifying a reform that was primarily intended to further reduce civic
space and enhance authoritarian control over society, thus mirroring a wider
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international trend. Intrusive laws and policies imposed on domestic and on international
civil society groups are indeed by no means unique to the case of Burundi. Restrictions
on the funding, the registration, the permission to conduct activities and the indepen-
dence of NGOs and watchdogs in the region (see, e.g. Smidt (2018: 5) on Kenya, a
country also under investigation by the International Criminal Court) as well as the
international donors’ response to shrinking civic space may have sent the signal to the
Burundi government that, despite its aid dependency, it could safely adopt the 2017
ONGE legislation and get away with it.
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2. Estimated demographic proportions – not based on any post-colonial ethnic census but gen-
erally accepted among scholars and policy-makers – are 85% Hutu, 14% Tutsi, and 1% Twa.
3. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v¼kXG7hGFZKqA
4. “Le recrutement du personnel local doit se faire dans le respect des e´quilibres ethniques et de
genre dispose´s dans la Constitution de la Re´publique du Burundi.” The initial bill referred to
the ethnic balance only. During the parliamentary debate, the gender balance was added. A
suggestion by one member of parliament to also add the regional balance was rejected.
5. Interview Pieter-Jan Hamels (11.11.11): https://www.vpro.nl/programmas/bureau-buitenland/
speel*RBX_VPRO_15337266*burundi-wijst-ngo-s-de-deur*.html
6. Document on file with the author. In the absence of identity cards mentioning ethnicity, self-
identification is indeed the method used to register the ethnic identity of electoral candidates.
7. Interestingly, in its later communique´ of 8 February 2019, the CNS referred to its ONGE
suspension as a “recommendation,” which is factually wrong but legally in line with its status
as an advisory body (Law of 31 August 2008).
8. However, new procedures may also implicitly pertain to ethnicity. For instance, one may
eliminate prior ONGE experience as a requirement for new applications, a condition de facto
likely to favour Tutsi candidates, as explained in more detail below.
9. Several examples on file with the author.
10. Available here: www.uantwerpen.be/images/uantwerpen/container49546/files/Burundi/eth
nic/200619.pdf
11. In Muyinga province, the provincial governor as well requested ONGEs to provide informa-
tion on the composition of local staff (letter of 18 January 2018 – on file with the author).
12. https://twitter.com/un_burundi/status/1052949910532841472
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13. https://twitter.com/AnneSCasper/status/1053016517456084992
14. In June 2019, the UB announced the establishment of a monument in memory of the Hutu





17. See question 84 of the questionnaire available here: http://afrobarometer.org/countries/bur
undi/burundi-round-5-questionnaire. Interestingly, the same question was no longer asked
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Ethnische Quoten und ausla¨ndische
Nichtregierungsorganisationen in Burundi: Zur Rechtfertigung
zivilgesellschaftlicher Einschra¨nkungen als Affirmative Action
Zusammenfassung
Seit Januar 2017 mu¨ssen ausla¨ndische Nichtregierungsorganisationen (NROs) in Burundi eth-
nische Quoten fu¨r einheimische Bescha¨ftigte erfu¨llen (60 Prozent Hutu und 40 Prozent Tutsi).
Diese Quotenpflicht wurde vor dem Hintergrund wachsender Angst vor einer erneuten
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Ethnisierung von Politik und Gesellschaft, versta¨rkter Kontrolle der Zivilgesellschaft sowie
angespannten Beziehungen zwischen der burundischen Regierung und ihren Partnern in den
Entwicklungszusammenarbeit beschlossen. Wa¨hrend die Beho¨rden die Regelungen als Gegen-
maßnahmen fu¨r jahrzehntelange ethnische Diskriminierung darstellen, zeigt eine Analyse der
Gesetzesreform, dass etliche andere Motivationen und starke Parteiinteressen fu¨r ihre Annahme
und Durchsetzung verantwortlich sind. Die Reform spiegelt einen weltweiten Trend wider, dass
zivilgesellschaftliche Freira¨ume zunehmend unter Druck geraten. Der Fall Burundi zeigt auch, wie
die diskursive Strategie des Regimes einen Keil zwischen NROs und ihre Geldgeber treibt.
Daru¨ber hinaus analysiert die Fallstudie die instrumentelle Verwendung von Unklarheit und
Ambiguita¨t in Bezug auf den gesetzlichen Wortlaut und die Durchsetzung der ethnischen Quoten.
Schlagwo¨rter
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